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actions.2 Both models maintain that compassion is made 
possible by the ability of the one who feels compassion 
(source) to identify with the plight of the individual for 
whom compassion is felt (target).3 They diverge in their 
analyses ofhow identification is achieved. One account, 
advanced separately by Lawrence A. Blum and Adrian 
M. S. Piper, contends that imaginative reconstruction 
of the other's subjective experiences is necessary for 
identification.4 The alternative, which I develop, denies 
that imagination is required for identification, but admits 
that it can playa facilitating role. That the source has a 
particular set of beliefs, including beliefs about the 
I target's vulnerability and its role in occasioning the 
target's plight, as well as beliefs about the source's 
My thesis is that it can be, and frequently is, rational similar vulnerability and consequent liability to 
for humans to feel compassion for nonhuman animals. misfortune, can suffice for identification.5 
Compassion for animals can be explained by examining Examining compassion for nonhuman animals not 
several modes of connection between humans and other only reveals the limitations of the imagination-based 
animals. The connections encompass modes of account; it also underscores some advantages of the 
identification between humans and other animals, for belief-based model. The weaknesses of the BlumJPiper 
example: imaginative reconstructions of their subjective view are discussed in part II. The contention ofpart III is 
experiences, beliefs about humans and other animals, that the original version of the belief-based model can 
including beliefs about similarities between species, be amended to explain how human compassion for other 
other emotions toward animals, such as kinship feelings, animals is possible, appropriate, and rational. Part IV 
and outlooks or ways of life that reflect value judgments concludes by briefly sketching conditions under which 
about and attitudes toward nonhuman animals. To feel compassion is misnamed, misplaced, or irrational. 
compassion for animals is to be connected with them A preliminary comment. Both accounts presuppose 
in an especially complex way. The challenge of this a cognitively complex conception ofemotion, according 
essay is to comprehend this connection. 
Two competing accounts of compassion have 
emerged in recent philosophical literature. l Both rely 
on a core definition of compassion as an intense 
emotional response to the misfortune of another, which 
includes suffering with the other, and concern for the 
other's good. This concern is frequently expressed in 
benevolent other-regarding thoughts, desires, and 
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to which both belief and affect are essential components. 
The conception's main features are: 
1) At least some emotions are composites of beliefs 
and feelings; 
2) There are beliefs that characteristically accompany 
each kind of emotion that distinguish it from every 
other kind; and 
3) Some of these beliefs are about the target of the 
emotion.6 
Consequently, the physiological states experienced by 
a person who feels emotion cannot be identified as a 
particular emotion, for example, compassion, pity, or 
anger, without reference to that person's beliefs. 
n 
Neither Blum nor Piper claims to explain com-
passion for nonhuman animals, but, instead, both restrict 
their accounts to compassion between human persons. 
This restriction is related to their belief that imaginative 
identification with the other's condition is required 
for compassion. Blum maintains that "failure of 
imagination is typically not a purely intellectual or 
cognitive failure; for it can itself be part of a more 
general failure to regard the other as fully human, or to 
take that humanity sufficiently seriously" and that "the 
limits of a person's capacities for imaginative 
reconstruction set limits on her capacity for 
compassion."7 For Piper, compassion requires "an 
application of modal imagination to a particular kind 
of imaginative object, namely, a human subject, and to 
a particular quality of that kind of object, namely, her 
inner states."s That the source of compassion should 
imagine what it would be like for himself or herself to 
be in the other's condition is not, for the Blum/Piper 
account, sufficient for identification. Instead, the source 
must be able to imaginatively reconstruct the negative 
experiences that the other is undergoing. This is 
reasonable. Different people sometimes react differently 
to similar circumstances. Since compassion includes 
suffering with another and concern for the other's good, 
it makes sense to require that the other's experiences 
should be the basis of imaginative identification. 
Our modes of epistemological access to the 
experiences of others are, however, limited. We work 
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primarily by inference and extrapolation. The story is 
familiar. We have inner, subjective experiences, and 
behave in recognizable ways when we have them. We 
observe the similar behavior of others and infer that 
they have inner experiences similar to ours that correlate 
with their observable behavior. When we know of 
another's character, beliefs, and desires, we have a 
firmer basis for making judgments about the quality of 
his or her subjective experiences. In short, the better 
our knowledge of the other, the more likely that our 
imagination is a reliable guide to the quality of his or 
her inner life. 
This presents a difficulty for attempts by 
imagination-based accounts to explain compassion 
for animals. Our modes of access to the inner 
experiences of nonhuman animals are more restricted 
than our modes of access to the experiences of fellow 
humans. Though some forms of animal behavior are 
similar to human behavior, other differences between 
species make unlikely consistently reliable inferences 
from observations of similar behavior to the conclusion 
of similar subjective experiences. Consequently, if 
imaginative reconstructions of their subjective states 
are based on these inferences, imagination is unlikely 
to be a trustworthy indicator of the nature and quality 
of their experiences. 
Imaginative reconstructions give particularly 
dubious clues to the inner experiences ofanimals whose 
neurophysiology and observable behavior are quite 
dissimilar from ours. Thomas Nagel goes to the heart 
of this problem when he writes: 
Our own experience provides the basic material 
for our imagination, whose range is therefore 
limited.... I want to know what it is like for a 
bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am 
restricted to the resources ofmy own mind, and 
those resources are inadequate to the task. I 
cannot perform it either by imagining additions 
to my present experience, or by imagining 
segments gradually subtracted from it, or by 
imagining some combination of additions, 
subtractions, and modificationsY [Italics his.] 
If imaginative reconstruction of another's subjective 
experiences is required for compassion, and if our 
abilities to imaginatively identify with the inner 
experiences of animals are limited, then it is possible 
to feel compassion for nonhuman animals on fewer 
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occasions than we think. The possibility of compassion 
on these occasions is premised on our ability to 
imaginatively enter into the subjective experiences of 
animals with reasonable accuracy. How might the 
imagination-based view account for cases in which we 
think we feel compassion for animals, yet cannot 
imaginatively reconstruct their inner experiences? One 
possibility is that we actually experience some other 
closely related emotion, and have simply misnamed our 
feeling. The imagination-based account should enable 
us to identify and explain our error and, also, spur us on 
to find more nuanced explanations of our emotions 
toward animals. Another possibility involves departing 
from the claim that compassion requires imagination. 
When we lack a firm basis for imaginative identification, 
yet think we feel compassion-for example, ifwe think 
we feel compassion for a bat-our emotion is indeed 
compassion, but is misplaced or irrational. The 
appropriateness or rationality of compassion, but not its 
possibility, would depend on our ability to imaginatively 
identify with the animal's subjective experiences. 
In part III, I argue for different conclusions. When 
we think we feel compassion for other animals, this 
usually is what we feel, even when imagination is an 
unreliable guide to their subjective experiences. (The 
imagination-based account does not include resources 
for an "error theory" that could explain why we have 
apparently mistaken other emotions for compassion.) In 
addition, compassion for animals is, frequently, neither 
misplaced nor irrational. Both claims can be substantiated 
by relinquishing the imagination-based account and 
turning to the belief-based model of compassion. 
III 
The imagination-based account leads us astray by 
requiring imaginative identification for compassion. 
Imagination is not the only way in which identification 
can be achieved. Other modes of identification are 
possible. Elsewhere I have claimed: 
, if X feels compassion for Y, X's having the 
following set of true and/or justified beliefs is 
sufficient for X's compassion for Y to be 
rational: 
(I) X must believe that X or someone close 
to X is vulnerable and, because of this 
vulnerability, is susceptible to misfortune; 
(2) X must believe that X or someone close 
to X is similar to Y in that X or someone 
close to X and Y are both vulnerable; 
(3) X must believe that Y's vulnerability 
played a part in occasioning Y's mis-
fortune; and 
(4) X must believe that Y's misfortune is 
serious. lO 
X's having these beliefs is not only sufficient for the 
rationality of X's compassion for Y, it also allows X to 
identify with Y's plight. These beliefs make X's 
compassion for Y possible and rational. The rationality 
of X's compassion does not depend on X's acknowl-
edging in himself or herself the particular vulnerability 
believed to occasion Y's misfortune. X need only make 
the general judgment that he or she is vulnerable, as is 
Y, and, consequently, can also experience misfortune. I I 
Two challenges must be met if the belief-based 
account is to provide a convincing alternative to 
imagination-based attempts to explain compassion for 
animals. More must be said about how identification 
can be achieved.12 Also, questions about justification 
must be answered. 
Bringing together two ideas helps to clarify 
identification. One is the distinction between the act of 
identifying and the content of identification.13 The other 
is the notion that identification is rarely an all-or-nothing 
affair but, instead, a matter of degree. We are able to 
identify with others in varying degrees. The different 
degree of identifiability fall along a continuum, from 
thinner to thicker. The richer the content, the thicker 
our identification. 
On the Blum/Piper analysis, imagination provides 
both the act of identifying with the target ofcompassion 
and the content of the identification. On the belief-based 
account, the act of identifying is made possible by the 
source's having the required beliefs. The beliefs 
themselves give identification some content. Suppose 
I believe that you are experiencing a misfortune, for 
example, a bad presentation of a paper at a professional 
conference, because of some particular vulnerability, 
such as the tendency to go blank while speaking before 
an audience. Since. I believe myself to be similarly 
vulnerable and similarly liable to distress, these beliefs 
could provide me with a basis for identifying with your 
plight. Other sources, such as experience and 
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imagination, can add content to my belief-based 
identification. Benevolent other-regarding emotions and 
attitudes, such as love, friendship, and kinship feelings, 
can also strengthen our identification with another. They 
manifest care and concern, and enable us to feel close 
to others, thereby facilitating identification with those 
for whom they're felt. 
Along the thinner side of the spectrum is the degree 
of identification needed to have compassion for a bat. 
Since bats are so dissimilar from humans, the only 
beliefs likely to make possible an act of identification 
between source and target are about existential 
vulnerabilities, that is, the kinds of vulnerabilities, such 
as susceptibility to sickness and death, that can occasion 
misfortune for all finite beings.14 These beliefs could 
be the only link between the human person and the bat. 
In this case, the content of identification is thin indeed. 
But it need not be so thin. Suppose the source of 
compassion is a biologist who knows and loves bats. 
The biologist's specialized knowledge and interest in 
bats can add content to his or her belief-based 
identification with the target of emotion. 
The belief-based account also faces questions of 
justification. Many similarities between humans, 
including similar vulnerabilities, occasion what we 
usually regard as misfortunes. Beliefs about human 
weaknesses and their role in occasioning misfortune 
are not especially hard to justify. Reliable judgments 
do not require special knowledge or expertise. By 
contrast, justifying our beliefs about animals can be 
complicated, since it can require technical knowledge 
that many people lack. Fewer similarities between 
human and nonhuman animals than between humans, 
and less accessible knowledge about actual similarities, 
can lead to error. We might believe that animals are 
similar to us when they're different. We could be 
mistaken about their vulnerabilities, which might be 
unlike ours. What would be a misfortune for us if we 
were in their situation mightnot be unfortunate for them. 
Lacking the appropriate knowledge of animal biology 
and behavior, we might not be able to identify what 
are, for them, true misfortunes. 
The key to answering these concerns lies in the 
realization that compassion for animals is oneofseveral 
modes ofconnection between us and them. Compassion 
and the beliefs about similar vulnerability and similar 
liability to misfortune that distinguish it are frequeptly 
components ofa complete network ofemotions, values, 
beliefs, attitudes, and actions that connect us with other 
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beings, describe our relationships with them, and locate 
our place among other inhabitants in a shared universe. 
This matrix can, but need not be, sufficiently inclusive 
and well-developed to be considered a worldview. The 
rational warrant of compassion as a response to the 
misfortunes of nonhuman animals depends on the 
rationality of its distinguishing beliefs. The warrant of 
both,beliefs and, consequently, emotion, depends not 
just on the extent to which these beliefs accurately 
reflect the facts of human and animal biology but also 
on the coherence of compassion and its characteristic 
beliefs with a conceptual/evaluative framework. A 
completejustification ofcompassion for animals should 
locate the emotion's place within this framework. 
This suggests direct and indirect justifications of 
compassion. The former warrants the emotion by 
identifying the beliefs characteristic ofcompassion that 
furnish the basis of identification between source and 
target and by justifying these beliefs by showing their 
fit with facts. Indirect justification affords a different 
warrant by assuring that compassion coheres with other 
elements of an inclusive conceptual/evaluative 
framework. Direct and indirect justifications are not 
mutually exclusive. Direct is the primary mode of 
warranting compassion, while indirect is a supplementary 
form of justification. 
An example illustrates direct justification. Suppose 
a field biologist, studying a gorilla family in their natural 
habitat, feels what she believes is compassion when a 
family member dies. Does she feel compassion, or a 
related emotion? If it is compassion, is it appropriate or 
rational? To determine whether compassion is felt, we 
must learn whether there is a basis for identification 
between biologist and gorillas. Imaginative recon-
struction of their subjective experiences could supply a 
basis for identification. But if she identifies through 
imagination, it is likely because she believes them 
similar to her, including being similarly vulnerable to 
experiencing the death of a loved one. However, if she 
bas these beliefs, which are based on true and/orjustified 
beliefs about similarities between gorilla and human 
grief, not only can she compassionately identify with 
their plight, but her emotion is also appropriate and 
rational, since her beliefs about herself and them are 
likely justified. 
The biologist has expert knowledge that many 
laypeople lack, and this might bias the example in favor 
of the belief-based account. Consider another example. 
Suppose a pet owner, lacking in specialized knowledge 
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of animal biology or behavior, feels what she believes 
is compassion for her cat, whom she believes is ill. Does 
she really feel compassion, and if so, is her feeling 
appropriate or rational? Has she a basis for identifying 
with her pet's plight? She might feel able to 
imaginatively identify with its subjective experiences. 
But what if imagination is unreliable? What if the actual 
differences between her and her cat preclude reliable 
inferences from the nature and quality of her own 
subjective states to those of the animal? She might yet 
be able to identify, if she has the appropriate set of true 
and/or justified beliefs about herself and her cat. The 
set would include the beliefs that the cat is weak or 
vulnerable, that this vulnerability has occasioned some 
misfortune that the animal experiences, and that she is 
similar enough to the cat to be similarly vulnerable and, 
consequently, liable to misfortune. These beliefs could 
be justified on the basis of the owner's observations of 
the cat's behavior and its similarities to hers when she 
experiences distress and on subsequent inferences to 
the fact that the cat, too, is in distress when displaying 
similar behavior. However, this kind of inference can 
be unreliable. It can be strengthened by corroboration 
from more knowledgeable sources, such as information 
from a veterinarian. 
When an individual's beliefs about the target are 
not well grounded in a knowledge of facts about 
animals, indirect justification can supplement direct 
justification of compassion. Suppose I feel what I 
believe is compassion for an animal that is significantly 
dissimilar from humans, such as a bat. Is this emotion 
really compassion, and could it be rational or 
appropriate? Is there a basis for identifying with the 
animal? Imagination is not a likely means of reliable 
identification, but, unless I have specialized knowledge, 
neither are my beliefs about the similarities of bats and 
humans, nor about the vulnerabilities and misfortunes 
of bats. I might not know how to identify a bona fide 
misfortune of a bat and, consequently, could falsely 
believe the animal to be in distress, or fail to spot a true 
calamity. Despite this potential for error, a bridge 
between source and target can be laid by my having an 
appropriate set of beliefs about our similarities with 
respect to existential vulnerabilities and the misfortunes 
they occasion. My compassion is warranted provided 
that these beliefs are true and/or justified. 
However, questions arise. Are beliefs about 
existential vulnerabilities too general to provide a 
sufficient basis for compassionate identification? Could 
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I know that my compassion is appropriate or rational 
without checking my beliefs about the animal's 
condition against biological facts? Another way of 
identifying with the bat's plight is given by emotions 
directed toward a particular animal or generally felt for 
nature or animals. Love, kinship feelings, and awe or 
reverence bespeak an attitude of care and concern for 
other beings. These emotions can forge connections 
between the source and target of compassion, thereby 
providing a stronger degree of identification than is 
achieved only through beliefs. Consequently, 
compassion is possible even for animals significantly 
dissimilar from humans. 
The appropriateness and rationality of compassion 
are bolstered by its coherence with other beliefs, 
emotions, values, and attitudes that connect the source 
with other beings. The firmer the fit between 
compassion and other elements of this larger conceptualJ 
evaluative network, the more rational is compassion. A 
qualification is needed to accommodate a case in which 
the entire network, including compassion, is coherent 
but fails to fit facts. Lacking contact with reality, even 
a coherent set of beliefs, emotions, values, and attitudes 
must be judged irrational. 
IV 
The previous remarks explain how compassion for 
animals is possible, appropriate, and rational. To 
conclude, we can sketch conditions under which 
compassion is misnamed, misplaced, or irrational. 
To misname compassion is to mistake a related 
emotion for compassion. Both belief and affect are 
components of emotion. Emotions are identified by 
referring to distinguishing beliefs. The beliefs 
characteristic of compassion permit identification 
between source and target. Other modes of identification 
are possible. Without the ability to identify with 
another's plight, a person cannot be moved to 
compassion, but might mistake for compassion another 
emotion, such as pity or sympathy. 
Compassion is misplaced or inappropriate when its 
distinguishing beliefs about vulnerability and misfortune 
are mistaken. Even when these beliefs are not mistaken, 
compassion can be morally inappropriate. For example, 
if we believe that Hitler and his followers were sane, it 
would be morally inappropriate to feel compassion at 
their demise. This is because we believe them responsible 
for their deeds, think they ought to have known their 
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actions were wrong, and judge they should have felt 
remorse for their wrongdoing. Similarreasons can render 
compassion for animals morally inappropriate for 
members of species where there is evidence ofcognitive, 
emotional, and moral capabilities.1S 
Direct and indirect justification supply two distinct 
criteria for assessing the rationality of compassion: fit 
with facts and coherence. Though the rational warrant 
of compassion is strengthened by coherence, direct 
justification takes pride of place over indirect. Fit with 
facts is the ultimate arbiter of the rationality of 
compassion. Consequently, compassion is irrational if 
the source persists in feeling it after being made aware 
of mistaken beliefs about the target's experiences or if 
the source lacks evidence of the target's misfortune, 
even if compassion coheres with elements of a more 
inclusive conceptual/evaluative scheme. 
What about a case in which compassion for an 
animal is rational, since it fits the facts, but fails to 
cohere with other elements of a conceptual/evaluative 
network? Suppose a speciesist, despite himself or 
herself, feels compassion for a suffering animal. In this 
case, the foregoing analysis has a hopeful implication. 
If compassion for animals can be and frequently is 
rational, this is a potentially valuable weapon in 
arguments against speciesism, since the speciesist is not 
free to dismiss compassion as merely irrational 
sentimentality. To be sure, the speciesist could try to 
revise the emotion to cohere with his or her other beliefs 
and attitudes. Butrevision could proceed in the opposite 
direction. We can hope that the force ofrational emotion 
affords inroads where dispassionate reason alone fails 
to effect morally constructive changes in outlook. 
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